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The Need for Warrants Authorizing Foreign
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A Call for Formalism
Justin M. Sandbergt
Federal agents rush into a house in Kenya to search for informa-
tion about a worldwide terrorist organization. This once-rare scenario
figures prominently in the new, post-September 11 world, and it
formed the facts of United States v Bin Laden.1 In Bin Laden, the court
held that a warrant is not required for a search by the United States
government of an American citizen living abroad when the search is
for foreign intelligence purposes. The court fit its decision under the
rubric of the "foreign intelligence exception" to the Fourth Amend-
ment's Warrant Clause.! By deciding Bin Laden in this fashion, the
court resurrected a long-dormant debate regarding the existence of
the foreign intelligence exception, which applies to searches of agents
of foreign powers for foreign intelligence information.
The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment has been inter-
preted to require the Executive to obtain a warrant based on probable
cause prior to a search or seizure. The Supreme Court has long read
this clause in conjunction with the first clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment, yielding the rule that a search or seizure is unreasonable unless
accompanied by a warrant. But the Court has recognized some excep-
tions to this rule.
t B.A. 1999, University of Notre Dame; J.D. Candidate 2002,The University of Chicago.
1 126 F Supp 2d 264 (S D NY 2000). The defendant in Bin Laden was Wadih El Hage, an
alleged member of Usama Bin Laden's al Qaeda terrorist network. El Hage, an American citizen
living in Nairobi, Kenya, had been indicted with other alleged al Qaeda operatives for the bomb-
ings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
2 Id at 277. For purposes of this Comment, unless otherwise noted, the term "search" re-
fers to a search conducted by the United States Government.
3 Id at 277.
4 Id at 271.
5 US Const Amend IV ("[No Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.').
6 See Illinois v McArthur, 531 US 326,332-33 (2001) (holding that police officers did not
violate the Fourth Amendment when they prevented a man from entering his house for two
hours while they searched it).
7 See, for example, Ferguson v City of Charleston, 121 S Ct 1281,1288-92 (2001) (discuss-
ing exceptions to the warrant rule in certain drug-testing cases); Michigan Department of State
Police v Sitz, 496 US 444,455 (1990) (allowing suspicionless stops at drunk driver checkpoints);
Michigan v Summers, 452 US 692,705 (1981) (permitting temporary seizure to prevent flight and
to protect officers executing a search warrant); Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1, 30 (1968) (upholding a
temporary seizure and limited search for weapons).
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Prior to 1978, however, the Supreme Court remained agnostic re-
garding the foreign intelligence exception, and the circuit courts split
on the issue. In a 1972 case, United States v United States District Court
(Keith),8 the Court announced a generally applicable test for
determining when there should be such an exception to the Warrant
Clause.9 The test stated that courts should, among other things, look to
see whether a warrant requirement would "unduly frustrate the ef-
forts of Government to protect itself from acts of subversion and
overthrow."'" The circuit courts applied this test and divided on one
question: whether a foreign intelligence exception should apply to
searches conducted domestically.'"
In 1978, before the courts could resolve this matter, Congress
passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA").'2 FISA
creates a framework for issuing warrants in situations where the gov-
ernment seeks foreign intelligence information. 3 Under FISA, no for-
eign intelligence search can occur until the President or the Attorney
General issues a warrant and a special court, the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, approves it.' By its terms, however, FISA does not
apply outside the borders of the United States"
Arising outside of FISA's jurisdiction (the United States border),
Bin Laden breathed new life into the debate regarding the foreign in-
telligence exception. No court before had addressed the constitution-
ality of a foreign intelligence search of an American citizen abroad. 6 It
is important to note that it is an open question whether the Fourth
8 407 US 297 (1972).
9 Id at 315.
10 Id.
11 Compare United States v Truong, 629 F2d 908, 913 (4th Cir 1980) (holding that "a uni-
form warrant requirement would ... 'unduly frustrate' the President in carrying out his foreign
affairs responsibilities"), quoting Keith, 407 US at 315; United States v Butenko, 494 F2d 593,606
(3d Cir 1974) (holding that a prior judicial approval is not necessary when a search is conducted
"solely for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information"); and United States v
Brown, 484 F2d 418,426 (5th Cir 1973) (holding that "the President may constitutionally author-
ize warrantless wiretaps for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence."); with Zweibon v
Mitchell, 516 F2d 594, 655 (DC Cir 1975) (finding that the President must receive judicial ap-
proval prior to conducting a wiretap of a domestic organization that was not collaborating with a
foreign power). See also United States v Buck, 548 F2d 871,875 (9th Cir 1977) (holding that for-
eign security wiretaps "are a recognized exception to the general warrant requirement").
12 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-511,92 Stat 1783, codified at
50 USC §§ 1801-11 (1994 & Supp 1999).
13 The original legislation did not contain provisions relating to physical searches. Those
were added in 1994. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L No 103-359,
108 Stat 3443, codified at 50 USC §§ 1821-29 (1994 & Supp 1999).
14 50 USC § 1822(a)-(c) (1994 & Supp 1999). Under FISA, the Attorney General may is-
sue warrants at the President's designation.
15 50 USC § 1822(c).
16 Bin Laden, 126 F Supp 2d at 277.
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Amendment applies to any search of a United States citizen abroad.'7
If the Fourth Amendment does not apply abroad, then the foreign in-
telligence exception is irrelevant because it would be swallowed up by
a larger international exception to the Warrant Clause. After a cursory
analysis, the Bin Laden court determined that the Fourth Amendment
plausibly applied to American citizens abroad. s Then, using the Keith
framework, it ruled that there was no warrant requirement on account
of the President's needs in conducting foreign policy.'9
This Comment shows that the courts cannot properly apply the
Keith standard because it forces them to make foreign policy assess-
ments, a task for which they are unprepared and ill equipped. Accord-
ing to the current test, a court determines whether there is an excep-
tion to the Warrant Clause by deciding whether a warrant require-
ment would be an undue burden on the Executive's discharge of her
duty to protect the nation against "subversion and overthrow."2 The
courts, however, are formally and functionally unfit to make such a
foreign policy judgment.
Specifically, the courts lack the expertise and bureaucracy neces-
sary to be considered competent in foreign affairs because the Consti-
tution allocates this sphere of responsibility to the political branches.
Due to this lack of competence, and the Executive's comparative ex-
pertise in foreign affairs, courts have been overly deferential to the
Executive in cases involving foreign intelligence searches. In doing so,
they have inadequately protected individual rights by abdicating their
Fourth Amendment role as the neutral intermediary between the Ex-
ecutive and the citizenry.
17 Supreme Court case law, while ambiguous, suggests that the warrant requirement could
be generally applicable. In Reid v Covert, 354 US 1 (1957), a plurality held that the Bill of Rights
applies to U.S. citizens in foreign countries. Id at 6. Moreover, the Court stated that it could find
no reason to pick and choose among "the remarkable collection of'Thou shalt nots"' when ap-
plying the Bill of Rights's limitations to U.S. government actions abroad. Id at 9. More recently,
however, a plurality of the Court has stated that Reid implicated only the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments and not the Fourth. United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259,270 (1990). In
dicta, the court noted that the concurrences in Reid limited the plurality's sweeping language. Id.
According to this reading, Reid holds only that "citizens stationed abroad could invoke the pro-
tection of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments." Id. Five members of the Court in Verdugo, however,
did not join in this reasoning. Id at 277,282,279,297 (Kennedy and Stevens concurring; Marshall,
Brennan, and Blackmun dissenting). Given the heavily fractured nature of the Court, the prece-
dential status of Verdugo is unclear. Compare United States v Barona, 56 F3d 1087,1093 (9th Cir
1995) (adopting Verdugo's narrow reading of Reid), with United States v Boynes, 149 F3d 208, 211
(3d Cir 1998) (insisting that Reid is untouched because Verdugo is limited by its concurrences to
noncitizens). Thus, Reid plausibly trumps Verdugo and provides the groundwork for the consid-
eration of the application of the foreign intelligence exception overseas. See also Bin Laden, 126
F Supp 2d at 270.
18 Bin Laden, 126 F Supp 2d at 270-71.
19 Id at 277 (finding "the power of the Executive to conduct foreign intelligence collection
would be significantly frustrated by the imposition of a warrant requirement in this context").
20 Keith, 407 US at 315.
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Therefore, the courts should replace the current standard with a
rule: a warrant is required for all foreign intelligence searches of
American citizens abroad. By announcing a warrant rule, the courts
could resolve the tension engendered by the Keith standard; they
could protect individual rights without engaging in foreign policy
analysis.
Doctrinally, this rule would fit into both the "new formalism"'', in
foreign affairs law and existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It
would be more desirable than the opposite default rule-one that
does not require a warrant for a foreign intelligence search abroad-
because it would comport better with the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment. Moreover, judges could effectively administer this rule
because they would only have to determine whether probable cause
exists2-they would not have to predict the outcomes of international
politics. Finally, a warrant issued for a foreign search would serve the
same important Executive-limiting function that it serves for a domes-
tic search.
In Part I, this Comment discusses the Keith standard and the cir-
cuit split surrounding its domestic application. Part I also briefly dis-
cusses the role FISA played in ending this debate domestically. Part II
addresses the problem with using the Keith standard in Bin Laden-
type cases, namely that courts are unable to apply the standard be-
cause they lack expertise in foreign policy. Finally, in Part III, this
Comment suggests that the solution to the Keith problem is a bright-
line warrant rule because it extricates the courts from foreign policy
considerations and allows them to focus on a legal question with
which they are familiar -determining whether probable cause exists.
I. THE KEITH STANDARD, THE CIRCUIT SPLIT, AND FISA's
SOLUTION WITH LIMITS
A. Keith: No Answer, but a Standard
In Keith, the Court considered whether there was an exception to
the Warrant Clause for domestic intelligence searches.3 The specific is-
sue in Keith was whether the President, acting through the Attorney
General, could "authorize electronic surveillance in internal security
21 See Jack Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U
Colo L Rev 1395,1396-97 (1999).
22 In the foreign intelligence context, the traditional probable cause standard would have
to be modified. Rather than looking for probable cause relating to a criminal offense, the court
would look for probable cause that the target of the search has foreign intelligence information.
See discussion in Part III.A.
23 The domestic intelligence search in Keith was aimed at material pertaining to the sub-
version and overthrow of the government but not involving foreign powers or their agents. Keith,
407 US at 308-09.
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matters without prior judicial approval."7 The Court said the Presi-
dent could not do so, but proclaimed that its holding left unanswered
the foreign intelligence exception question." The Court did announce,
however, a balancing test for determining whether there should be an
exception to the Warrant Clause. In the end, the wording of this test
determined the outcome of the foreign intelligence exception ques-
tion.
1. The Keith Court refused to rule on the foreign
intelligence exception.
The Supreme Court took great pains to distinguish the domestic
intelligence exception at issue in Keith from a possible foreign intelli-
gence exception. Early in the opinion, the Court argued that "the in-
stant case requires no judgment on the scope of the President's sur-
veillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within
or without this country."26 Later in the opinion, the Court again made a
similar admonition: "We have not addressed, and express no opinion
as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to the activities of
foreign powers or their agents." The Court repeated itself to leave no
doubt that the decision did not reflect its view of the propriety of a
foreign intelligence exception.
2. The announcement of a determinative standard.
While explicitly refusing to let its holding in Keith dictate the fu-
ture of the foreign intelligence exception, the Court formulated a bal-
ancing test that did just that. Used to determine whether there should
be an exception to the warrant requirement, the test stated:
As the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, our task is
to examine and balance the basic values at stake in this case: the
duty of Government to protect the domestic security, and the po-
tential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual
privacy and free expression. If the legitimate need of Govern-
ment to safeguard domestic security requires the use of elec-
tronic surveillance,7 the question is whether the needs of citizens
for privacy and free expression may not be better protected by
24 Id at 299.
25 Id at 308.
26 Id.
27 Id at 321-22.
28 Electronic surveillance and physical searches have been taken to be equally intrusive:
"Though physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth
Amendment is directed, its broader spirit now shields private speech from unreasonable surveil-
lance." Id at 313. -
The University of Chicago Law Review
requiring a warrant before such surveillance is undertaken. We
must also ask whether a warrant requirement would unduly frus-
trate the efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of sub-
version and overthrow directed against it.2'
Earlier in the opinion, the Court derived the duty to protect do-
mestic security from the President's oath to "preserve, protect and de-
fend the Constitution," which implicitly directs the President "to pro-
tect our Government against those who would subvert it or overthrow
it by unlawful means.'
'31
Against this duty, the Court purported to weigh the rights of the
individual to free expression and privacy, embodied in the First and
Fourth Amendments, respectively.2 The First Amendment was rele-
vant because of the specific. facts of Keith.n In pure Fourth Amend-
ment terms, then, the Court was supposed to balance the President's
duty to protect the government against the individual's right to pri-
vacy. But the Court's phrasing of the rights portion of the test stripped
it of any practical meaning: "[T]he question is whether the need of
citizens for privacy ... may not be better protected by requiring a war-
rant before such surveillance is undertaken." There was no question
there. The Court has long held that the citizen's right to privacy bene-
fited from the protection of a warrant." Thus, this part of the test was a
non-factor-the real moving parts were housed elsewhere.
The last line, asking "whether a warrant requirement would un-
duly frustrate the efforts of Government to protect itself from acts of
subversion and overthrow directed against it,"'3 drove this test. In de-
termining whether there should be an exception in this case, the Court
looked exclusively to factors that could cause the Executive to suffer
an undue burden.3 And while the Court acknowledged that the war-
29 Id at 314-15.
30 US Const Art I, § 1, cl 8.
31 Keith, 407 US at 310.
32 Id at 313-14.
33 Keith involved the surveillance of telephone conversations (speech), and there was a
concern that the domestic security search was part of a program to punish the defendants merely
for "unorthodoxy in their political beliefs" Keith, 407 US at 314.
34 Id at 315.
35 See United States v Watson, 423 US 411,445 (1976) (Marshall dissenting) ("Of course the
privacy of our citizens will be better protected by a warrant requirement."); Chimel v California,
395 US 752,761 (1969) (finding that a search of the defendant's house without a search warrant
violated his constitutional rights); McDonald v United States, 335 US 451, 455-56 (1948) ("The
Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the
privacy of the home."); Johnson v United States, 333 US 10,14 (1947) ("When the right of privacy
must reasonably yield to the right of search ... is to be decided by a judicial officer, not by*a po-
liceman or government enforcement agency.").
36 Keith, 407 Us at 315.
37 First, the Court considered (and dismissed) the claim that a warrant was not necessary
because the surveillance at stake in this case was aimed primarily at obtaining intelligence data,
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rant requirement would somewhat burden the Executive, it held that
the requirement would not impose an undue burden: "[T]his incon-
venience is justified in a free society to protect constitutional values."',
In sum, Keith stands for two important points. First, the holding in
Keith did not dictate, per se, the outcome of the foreign intelligence
exception question. Second, the Court introduced a balancing test for
determining whether there should be an exception to the warrant re-
quirement that, as written, determined the outcome of this question.
B. The Circuit Split
After Keith, four circuits-the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth-
decided that there was a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
requirement for searches conducted in the United States.4' The D.C.
Circuit came to the opposite conclusion.4 '1 As would be expected in the
wake of Keith, presidential power took center stage in the decisions
from both sides of the divide. The four circuits that upheld the excep-
tion believed a warrant requirement would impose an undue burden
on the President. The D.C. Circuit, on the other hand, thought a war-
rant should be required for foreign intelligence gathering, just as it
was for domestic intelligence gathering.
1. The Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits found a domestic
foreign intelligence exception.
The Third Circuit, in United States v Butenko,4 upheld a war-
rantless foreign intelligence search based on the President's need for
not at obtaining evidence for criminal prosecutions. Second, the Court rejected the claim that the
courts lack the ability to determine when there is probable cause to believe that surveillance is
necessary to protect national security. Finally, the Court dismissed the idea that introducing the
courts into intelligence matters increases the possibility of "security leaks." Id at 318-21.
38 Id at 321.
39 The second point is obviously important. The first point is important because the Court
recognizes that it is relatively less competent to decide on the foreign intelligence exception than
the domestic intelligence exception, and because it leaves the courts of appeals room to institute
the warrant requirement suggested by this Comment.
40 United States v Truong, 629 F2d 908, 913 (4th Cir 1980) (allowing a warrantless search
for foreign intelligence information); United States v Buck, 548 F2d 871,875 (9th Cir 1977) (rec-
ognizing the foreign security exception to the general warrant requirement for wiretaps); United
States v Butenko, 494 F2d 593,606 (3d Cir 1974) (holding that prior judicial approval is unneces-
sary for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information); United States v Brown, 484
F2d 418,426 (5th Cir 1973) (holding that the President may authorize warrantless wiretaps for
foreign intelligence gathering).
41 Zweibon v Mitchell, 516 F2d 594,655 (DC Cir 1975) (en banc) (holding that the Consti-
tution requires the President to seek prior authorization to wiretap a domestic organization that
is not an agent of a foreign state).
42 494 F2d 593 (3rd Cir 1974). In this case the defendant, a Soviet national, claimed that his
Fourth Amendment rights were violated by warrantless electronic searches conducted in the
United States, and that this information therefore tainted his conviction. Id at 596-97.
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flexibility and speed in foreign intelligence gathering.4 Specifically, the
court noted that a warrant requirement would impinge on the flexibil-
ity to conduct these operations because "foreign intelligence gathering
is a clandestine and highly unstructured activity ... [that] often can-
not be anticipated in advance."" Moreover, a warrant requirement
would slow down intelligence operations because it would require
those gathering the intelligence to "interrupt their activities and rush
to the nearest available magistrate to seek a warrant." 45
In United States v Truong," the Fourth Circuit permitted war-
rantless foreign intelligence searches because "the needs of the Execu-
tive are so compelling in foreign intelligence, unlike the area of do-
mestic security, that a uniform warrant requirement would, following
Keith, 'unduly frustrate' the President in carrying out his foreign af-
fairs responsibilities."4 7 Specifically, the Executive needs to use his
flexibility, speed, secrecy, expertise, and constitutional competence.
Flexibility, speed, and secrecy would be compromised by a warrant re-
quirement because it would present a procedural hurdle for the Ex-
ecutive and it would increase the chance of leaks. The court also ar-
gued that "the Executive possesses unparalleled expertise" that the
judiciary lacks because the President has a specialized bureaucracy
that keeps him informed about foreign affairs. s Finally, the court
noted that the Executive is "constitutionally designated as the pre-
eminent authority in foreign affairs.""
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v Brown, 2 found dispositive the
President's inherent power with respect to conducting foreign affairs,
holding that the President has the authority to conduct warrantless
searches over and above the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment. ' The logic of this decision flowed from the idea that the Presi-
dent's powers in foreign affairs are extraconstitutional." The Ninth
43 Id at 605.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 629 F2d 908 (4th Cir 1980). The defendants in this case sought to overturn their espio-
nage convictions because of warrantless searches and seizures. Id at 911.
47 Idat913.
48 Id at 913-15.
49 Id at 913.
50 Id at 913-14.
51 Id at 914.
52 484 F2d 418 (5th Cir 1973). The defendant in this case sought to overturn his conviction
because it was based on information obtained in warrantless wiretaps designed to collect foreign
intelligence information. Id at 425-26.
53 Id at 425-27.
54 Id. This position, associated with United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, 299 US 304,
318 (1936), has been derogated by a member of the Court and rejected by academics. See
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579,635-36 n 2 (1952) (Jackson concurring) (re-
ferring to the inherent power portion of Curtiss-Wright as "dictum"); Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal
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Circuit adopted, without much discussion, the reasoning of this and
the Third Circuit's decisions.-'
2. The D.C. Circuit denied the existence of the domestic foreign
intelligence exception.
The D.C. Circuit's plurality holding in Zweibon v Mitchell stood
on the other side of the circuit split. In Zweibon, a suit for damages,
the court held that there was no foreign intelligence exception when
the government searched citizens in the United States who were nei-
ther agents of a foreign government nor acting for a foreign power.57
But in dicta the court went further. The four-member plurality con-
cluded that nothing inherent in foreign intelligence matters suggests
that "a warrant procedure would actually fetter the legitimate intelli-
gence gathering functions of the Executive Branch."' The court went
on to say that, absent exigent circumstances, no foreign intelligence
search should be conducted without a search warrant.-9
In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected the arguments the
other circuits forwarded in favor of the exception. The court dismissed
the Third and Fourth Circuits' speed and flexibility arguments as
claims for the already existing exigent circumstances exception.60 In
renouncing the Fourth Circuit's secrecy argument, the court argued
that Keith put it aside in the domestic intelligence context, and it is no
more persuasive in the foreign intelligence context.61 The court re-
jected the expertise rationale because the Executive has always been
willing to allow the post hoc review of searches by courts, and there is
no reason to believe that courts would be any more competent to
conduct a review after a search rather than before it.62
The court repudiated the Fourth Circuit's constitutional alloca-
tion argument and the Fifth Circuit's "inherent power" argument by
asserting that a case is not beyond the ken of the judiciary simply be-
cause it touches on foreign affairs.3 The question of the foreign intelli-
Courts Foreign Affairs and Federalism, 83 Va L Rev 1617,1659 (1997) (describing Curtiss-Wright
as "the b~te noire of U.S. foreign relations law"); Michael J. Glennon, Two iews of Presidential
Foreign Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 Yale J Intl L 5,13 (1988) ("[The
majority opinion] in Curtiss-Wright is a muddled law review article wedged with considerable
difficulty between the pages of the United States Reports").
55 United States v Buck, 548 F2d 871,875-76 (9th Cir 1977).
56 516 F2d 594 (DC Cir 1975) (en banc).
57 Id at 614.
58 Id at 651.
59 Id.
60 Id at 649-50.
61 Id at 47.
62 Id at 644-45.
63 Id at 623 ("'Yet it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches on
foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."'), quoting Baker v Carr, 369 US 186, 211
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gence exception lies within the judiciary's expertise because it in-
volves "providing a bulwark against Executive excess, a task which the
Fourth Amendment deliberately allocated to the neutral officials of
the judiciary."'
C. FISA: A Solution with Limits
Before the Supreme Court could resolve this circuit split, Con-
gress passed FISA in 1978. FISA requires the Executive to obtain a
warrant for foreign intelligence searches conducted in the United
States.65 Under FISA, no foreign intelligence search can occur until the
President (or the Attorney General) issues a warrant, and a special
court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, approves it.6 Thus,
the passage of FISA resolved the question at the heart of the circuit
split. But, it left a gaping hole in the law -all searches that lay beyond
the United States border.
II. BIN LADEN AND THE KEITH STANDARD: FOREIGN POLICY
CONSIDERATIONS AND THE SACRIFICING OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Bin Laden resurrected the debate over the foreign intelligence
exception by arising outside of FISA's territorial limits. In doing so, it
revived Keith's undue burden standard. As the arguments in Bin
Laden show, this standard pushes courts outside of their proper role
by forcing them to consider questions of foreign policy. Understanda-
bly reluctant to venture into foreign policy, the courts have been
overly deferential to the Executive. As a result, they have inade-
quately protected individual rights.
A. Bin Laden and the Keith Standard
In Bin Laden, the defendant, an American citizen reputed to be
part of Osama Bin Laden's terrorist organization, sought to suppress
evidence seized by United States agents in a search of his house in
Kenya based on the absence of a warrant. The Government argued
that the search fell within the foreign intelligence exception because it
was aimed at foreign intelligence information held by an agent of a
foreign power6' After acknowledging the novelty of the issue, the
(1962).
64 Id at 624.
65 See FISA, 50 USC § 1801. See also notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
66 Id.
67 Bin Laden, 126 F Supp 2d at 269.
68 Id at 271. The court relies on the definitions of "agent" and "foreign power" contained in
FISA. Id at 278. The applicable definition of agent is a person who "knowingly engages in sabo-
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court determined that the foreign intelligence exception applied over-
seas because of the President's power over foreign affairs, the costs of
imposing a warrant requirement, the force of precedent, and the ab-
sence of a warrant procedure abroad.6'
In its conclusion, the court revealed that the Keith standard stood
behind its decision: "The [c]ourt finds that the power of the Executive
to conduct foreign intelligence collection would be significantly frus-
trated by the imposition of a warrant requirement in this context.' 0
Also, earlier in the opinion, the court cited Keith for the proposition
that a warrant should not be required if it is a disabling burden on the
Executive.7' e Bin Laden court's arguments reveal the problem with
this standard.
B. The Keith Standard Requires Courts to Consider Foreign Policy
The Keith standard is so broad that it forced the Bin Laden court
to consider issues of foreign policy. Twice the court cited Chicago &
Southern Airlines, Inc v Waterman Steamship Corpn for the proposi-
tion that "the judiciary should not interfere with the 'delicate' and
'complex' decisions of foreign policy which are 'wholly confided by
the Constitution to the political departments of the government, Ex-
ecutive and Legislative."'" It appears that the court wanted to avoid
imposing a warrant requirement because it believed the case raised a
foreign policy question. The court's decision to quote United States v
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp74 for the proposition that the President is
supreme in "the field of international relations"7 5 similarly showed the
court's belief that the question, as framed by Keith, was one of foreign
policy. Later in the opinion, the court quoted the Government's argu-
ment that the court would have a hard time determining the "interna-
tional consequences flowing from a decision on the merits' [sic] re-
garding Executive Branch foreign policy decisions.'76 The court then
indicated its specific foreign policy concern about deciding whether or
not to institute a warrant requirement: "Often these decisions have
significant impacts on the essential cooperative relationships between
tage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefore, or on behalf of a
foreign power." 50 USC § 1801(b)(2)(C). The relevant definition of a foreign power is "a group
engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefore" 50 USC § 1801(a)(4).
69 Bin Laden, 126 F Supp 2d at 271-78.
70 Id at 277.
71 Id at 273-74.
72 333 US 103 (1948).
73 Bin Laden, 126 F Supp 2d at 272,274.
74 299 US 304 (1936).
75 Bin Laden, 126 F Supp 2d at 272.
76 Id at 274.
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United States officials and foreign intelligence services.", Cooperative
relations with other nations are, after all, the lodestar of foreign pol-
icy.
78
Other courts have also interpreted the Keith standard to require
an assessment of foreign policy issues. In Truong, the court said, "The
President and his deputies are charged by the constitution with the
conduct of the foreign policy of the United States in times of war and
peace."79 This statement shows that the court here, as in Bin Laden,
considered the decision of whether to require a warrant a foreign pol-
icy one. Brown, by citing Chicago & Southern Airlines for the same
policy proposition Bin Laden did (namely, that the President has in-
herent authority to conduct foreign affairs), demonstrated that it too
categorized the decision as one of foreign policy.8' Finally, the Butenko
court thought foreign policy dictated the decision to permit war-
rantless foreign intelligence searches, writing that there is "strong pub-
lic interest" in the "efficient operation of the Executive's foreign pol-
icy."
, 8'
The Zweibon court, the foil in the circuit split, seemed to discount
the necessity of making a foreign policy decision in order to apply the
Keith standard. Obviously, the court was aware that this case involved
foreign policy at various levels.2 But, unlike the courts on the other
side of the circuit split, it did not consider whether it was competent to
apply the Keith test given its inherent foreign policy element. Though
the outcome of this decision may be normatively desirable, it arises ei-
ther from a mistaken interpretation of the Supreme Court's test in
Keith or a willful disregard of its dictates. Neither path is acceptable.
The functioning of the judiciary depends on the lower courts' faithful
adherence to Supreme Court precedent.3
77 Id.
78 Though perhaps changing, this has long been the case because nation-states have been
the only recognized actors on the international stage. Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of
Globalization: The Status of Non-Governmental Organizations under International Law, 6 Ind J
Global Legal Stud 579,620-21 (1999) (recognizing that traditionally only states were the actors
on the international scene); Gregory G.A. Tzeutschler, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liabil-
ity of Transnational Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 Colum Hum Rts L Rev
359,387 (1999) ("[T]he international legal system has not traditionally recognized non-state ac-
tors.").
79 Truong, 629 F2d at 914.
80 Brown, 484 F2d at 426.
81 Butenko, 494 F2d at 605.
82 Most pertinent for this Comment may be the fact that the court considered whether the
President alone was competent to make the decision to conduct a search abroad because of the
foreign affairs content. Zweibon, 516 F2d at 619-24.
83 Thurston Motor Lines, Inc v Jordan K. Rand, Ltd, 460 US 533,535 (1983) ("[N]eedless to
say, but only this Court may overrule one of its own precedents."); Hutto v Davis, 454 US 370,
375 (1982) ("[U]nless we wish anarchy to prevail in the federal judicial system, a precedent of
this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of
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C. Courts Are Ill Suited to Decide Foreign Policy Issues
Both textual and functional considerations indicate that the po-
litical branches rather than the courts should make foreign policy de-
cisions. The textual arguments arise out of the Constitution, which al-
locates the power to conduct foreign affairs to the political branches
and not to the judiciary.4 Under the Constitution, the Executive has
the power to act as the Commander-in-Chief make and ritify trea-
ties, appoint ambassadors,n and recognize foreign nations.s Congress
also has considerable foreign affairs powers under the Constitution,
including the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations,,' to
define and punish crimes committed on the high seas and offenses
against the law of nations,9 to declare war,9' and to raise and support
armies and navies.9 On the other hand, no provision of the Constitu-
tion grants the judiciary foreign affairs powers.n But there is also no
provision that explicitly excludes the courts from foreign affairs. Thus,
the textual argument for the inappropriateness of judicial decision-
making in the realm of foreign affairs is strong, but not conclusive.
Functional arguments complete the job started by the textual
ones.9' Courts are functionally in-suited to decide foreign policy ques-
those courts may think it to be.").
84 while a bare enumeration of powers makes the political branches appear to be on equal
footing in foreign affairs, the conventional wisdom is that the Executive has more power because
of the structure of the branches. The structure is said to favor the Executive, because Congress,
though it has foreign relations expertise and information, is "too diffuse, too public, and too de-
liberative to perform many foreign relations tasks." Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1398 (cited
in note 21).
85 US Const Art II, § 2,cl .
86 Id, § 2, ci 2.
87 Id.
88 Id, § 3. The power to receive ambassadors includes the power to recognize foreign na-
tions. See, for example, Goldwater v Carter, 481 F Supp 949,961 (D DC 1979).
89 US Const Art I, §8, c 3.
9' Id,§ 8,ci 10.
91 Id, § 8, el 11.
92 Id, § 8, cls 12-13.
93 The Constitution's grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts to hear cases involving the
high seas, ambassadors, and citizens from other states appears to grant the federal courts foreign
affairs power. US Const Art III, § 2. But this provision was aimed primarily at keeping the states
out of foreign affairs. Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as
Federal Law After Erie, 66 Fordham L Rev 393,406 (1997) (remarking that the Framers assigned
jurisdiction to cases touching on foreign affairs to federal courts in order to ensure national con-
trol over foreign affairs). See Baker v Carr, 369 US 186,211 (1962) (noting that a case does not
involve making foreign policy simply because it touches on foreign affairs).
94 These arguments are related, of course, because the superior functionality of the politi-
cal branches comes, in part, from the system set up by the text. But they are distinct arguments
because the text does not fully describe our government; it does not, for example, explicitly pro-
vide for the administrative state. So, in addition to the text of the Constitution, one must analyze
the practical workings of the government to understand the power relationships between the
branches.
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tions because they lack the ability to identify foreign relations inter-
ests."' The conventional wisdom is that the courts lack two important
resources for this task: information and expertise.9 First, courts do not
have access to the kind of foreign intelligence information-reports of
the intelligence agencies, the State Department, and the Department
of Defense-to which the political branches have access." Second,
courts do not have the same informed bureaucracies dedicated to for-
eign affairs that the Executive (for example, the State Department
and the CIA) and Congress (for example, committee and subcommit-
tee staff) possess.' Because of these deficiencies, the courts lack the
ability to identify the foreign relations interests of the United States,
an "enormously complex endeavor" and a necessary step in making
foreign policy decisions.9
D. Courts Defer to the Executive under Keith Because They Are
Aware of Their Relative Incompetence in Foreign Policy
Courts pondering the existence of the foreign intelligence excep-
tion have acknowledged their relative incompetence in foreign policy.
The Bin Laden Court approvingly noted, "It has been asserted that
the judicial branch is ill-suited to the task of overseeing the foreign in-
telligence collection. ' ' In Keith, the Supreme Court implied that
courts are relatively inexperienced in foreign policy by repeatedly dis-
tinguishing the question of the domestic intelligence exception from
the foreign intelligence exception. ' The Fourth Circuit was more ex-
plicit: "[T]he executive branch not only has superior expertise in the
area of foreign intelligence, it is also constitutionally designated as the
pre-eminent authority in foreign affairs. '1 Similarly, in Brown, the
Fifth Circuit wrote, "[I]t would be intolerable that courts, without the
95 The court in Keith, 407 US at 309, did not encounter this problem because that case
(with its domestic setting and parties) did not require an assessment of foreign policy.
96 Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1398 (cited in note 21) ("[The courts] lack the informa-
tion, expertise, unity, and national political accountability to make foreign relations judgments
for the nation.").
97 Chicago & Southern Airlines, 333 US at 111.
98 See id (discussing the judiciary's lack of "aptitude, facilities[, and] responsibility" for for-
eign policy decisions and, by implication, the political branches' more abundant resources in this
area).
99 Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1415 (cited in note 21).
100 Bin Laden, 126 F Supp 2d at 274.
101 Keith, 407 US at 308,321-22. The Court explicitly expressed an understanding of its rela-
tive incompetence in foreign policy in Itel Containers International Corp v Huddleston, 507 US
60,76 (1993) (noting that "the nuances of foreign policy 'are much more the province of the Ex-
ecutive Branch and Congress than of this Court') (citation omitted).
102 Truong, 629 F2d at 914.
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relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the
Executive taken on information properly held secret."'
Because the courts are conscious of their inability to consider
adequately the implications of foreign policy, they defer to the Execu-
five. The Executive's win-loss record in foreign intelligence exception
cases is one indication of the courts' deference to the Executive. In
every case that required a determination of the validity of the excep-
tion (Butenko,"'" Truong,n Brown,"" United States v Buck,"' Bin
Laden"'), the Executive won. In Zweibon, the court denied the exis-
tence of the exception, but it did so in dictum,"'" and did not consider
the policy implications in the same way.110
More pointedly, the Executive won because the courts deferred
to the Executive's superior competence in foreign policy: "The execu-
tive possesses unparalleled expertise to make the decision whether to
conduct foreign intelligence surveillance..... Or, as the court in Bu-
tenko starkly put it, courts could impose a warrant requirement, but
"the better course is to rely, at least in the first instance, on the good
faith of the Executive.' 12 Brown's deference was equally clear. Ac-
cording to Brown, courts have no place constraining the Executive be-
cause she has authority in foreign affairs "over and above the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment."3 Implicit in this statement is the
notion that authority originating outside the Constitution arises out-
side the Court's ability to limit it.1' The court in Bin Laden deferred
more subtly but no less importantly than the Butenko and Brown
courts, making repeated references to the superior competence of the
Executive in foreign policy matters."s
103 484 F2d at 426 (internal quotation marks omitted), quoting Chicago& Southern Airlines,
333 US at 111.
104 494 F2d at 608.
105 629 F2d at 914.
106 484 F2d at 426.
107 548 F2d 871,875 (9th Cir 1977).
103 126 F Supp 2d at 277.
109 516 F2d at 651.
110 See Part II.C.
111 Truong, 629 F2d at 913.
112 494 F2d at 605.
113 484 F2d at 426.
114 This argument for presidential power goes even further than the one proffered in the
oft-criticized Curtiss-Wright opinion. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 US at 320 (noting that even the
President's extraordinary foreign affairs power "must be exercised in subordination to the appli-
cable provisions of the Constitution"). See note 54.
115 Bin Laden, 126 F Supp 2d at 272-74.
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E. Judicial Deference Means That Individual Rights Are
Insufficiently Protected
Citizens should greet with apprehension the courts' decisions to
defer to the Executive on the Fourth Amendment question of whether
to institute a warrant requirement for foreign intelligence searches.
The Constitution interposes the courts between the Executive and the
citizenry in order to guard individuals from executive excess in
searches and seizures.11 6 Judicial deference to the Executive on foreign
policy issues is normally desirable because the Executive is more
competent than the courts in foreign affairs and thus more likely to
make the right decision. In this case, however, deference on the for-
eign policy issue requires deference on a Fourth Amendment issue-
whether to issue a warrant-that the Constitution purposefully gives
to the courts. If the courts defer to the Executive on this latter ques-
tion, they fail the American people (and the Fourth Amendment) by
abdicating their responsibility to limit the Executive's discretion.
In Keith, the Court discussed the interposition of the courts be-
tween the Executive and the citizenry. It cited approvingly Lord
Mansfield, who wrote, "It is not fit ... that the receiving or judging of
the information should be left to the discretion of the officer. The
magistrate ought to judge; and should give certain directions to the of-
ficer."117 The Court then continued: "[I]nherent in the concept of a
warrant is its issuance by a 'neutral and detached magistrate."1..8 Un-
der the Fourth Amendment, members of the executive branch do not
count as disinterested magistrates because they are responsible for en-
forcing the laws through investigation and prosecution."9
When the courts abdicate their Fourth Amendment responsibility,
executive excess threatens individual liberty. The Constitution posi-
tions the courts between the Executive and the people in order to en-
116 See Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 13-14 (1947) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection lies in shifting decisions to neutral judicial officers).
117 Keith, 407 US at 316.
118 Id at 317, quoting Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443,453 (1971).
119 Id. Some, such as the Bin Laden court, argue that post-search review substantially fulfills
the Fourth Amendment goals served by pre-search warrants. Bin Laden, 126 F Supp at 277. But
other courts have persuasively argued that post-search review serves as an inadequate proxy for
pre-search warrants, giving three reasons. First, it leaves the decision to search, in the first in-
stance, in the hands of the executive. See United States v Diggs, 544 F2d 116, 130 n 18 (3d Cir
1976) (noting that a neutral magistrate is "better able than those with personal interests at stake"
to make a decision about a search warrant). Second, it does not protect "against hindsight justifi-
cation" by government agents. Id. Third, post-search review only applies to searches in which a
criminal prosecution is brought by the state or in which a civil suit is brought against the state by
a target of a search; it fails in all other cases. See Keith, 407 US at 318 (explaining that post-
search review fails to reach cases that do not result in prosecution). See also Latta v Fitzharris,
521 F2d 246,257 (9th Cir 1975) (expressing concerns about executive discretion and post hoc jus-
tifications in the absence of a warrant requirement).
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sure that each search is reasonable and limited.ln The rationale is sim-
ple: if the Executive, a partisan, can convince a judge, a neutral party,
that a search is reasonable, then the chances are better, objectively
speaking, that the search is reasonable. 121 Or, as the Court eloquently
put it, warrants operate "as a matter of course 'to check the well-
intentioned but mistakenly over-zealous executive officers' who are a
part of any system of law enforcement. ' ' 2
The Fourth Amendment is too important to sacrifice. In Coolidge
v New Hampshire,'2 the Court used soaring language to synthesize its
previous decisions on the Fourth Amendment:
The effect of the decisions is: that such fights are declared to be
indispensable to the 'full enjoyment of personal security, personal
liberty and private property'; that they are to be regarded as of
the very essence of constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty
of them is as important and as imperative as are the guaranties of
the other fundamental fights of the individual citizen."
Given the importance of the Fourth Amendment, and the central
role the courts play in protecting it, deference to the Executive in for-
eigu intelligence exception cases is unacceptable: "Prior review by a
neutral and detached magistrate is the time-tested means of effectuat-
ing Fourth Amendment rights."'l
m. THE ANSWER TO THE KEiTH PROBLEM: A WARRANT RULE
The courts should exchange the Keith standard for a rule requir-
ing a warrant for foreign intelligence searches of American citizens
abroad. This rule would obviate the problem of possible judicial in-
competence in foreign affairs, instead allowing courts to rely on a core
area of competence-the application of law to fact. In addition, it
would track the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Finally, by cabin-
120 United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 259,296 (1990) (Brennan dissenting) (stating
that the warrant requirement "assures that a neutral magistrate has authorized the search and
limited its scope").
121 Id at 295.
122 Coolidge v New Hampshire, 403 US 443,481 (1971), quoting Gouled v United States, 255
US 298,304 (1921).
123 403 US 443 (1971).
124 Id at 454, n 4, quoting Gouled, 255 US at 303-04. The use of this quotation from Coo-
lidge is not intended to convey the idea that the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment is
so sacrosanct that a balancing test may never be used. See Tracey L. Meares and Bernard E.
Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social Science Research in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 90 J Crim L & Criminol 733, 741 (2000) (recognizing that rights-oriented
liberals 'take issue with the idea of balancing liberty interests against the interests of law en-
forcement in formulating the scope of constitutional rights" because they view "rights as
trumps").
125 Keith, 407 US at 318.
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ing executive discretion, a warrant rule would serve the same impor-
tant function abroad that it serves domestically.
A. The Warrant Rule Would Obviate the Problem of Judicial
Involvement in Foreign Policy
A rule requiring a court to issue a warrant before the Executive
could conduct a search abroad would avert the problem of judicial in-
competence in foreign policy. A court in this position would not have
to be competent in foreign policy because it would not have to engage
in an independent analysis of the effects of its decision on the United
States' foreign affairs. "By specifying the content of federal law prior
to the point of judicial decision,"' ' this new rule would fit comfortably
into what has been termed "the new formalism" in foreign affairs
law.7 ' New formalism is the term used to describe the Supreme
Court's trend of replacing standards with rules that limit the courts'
responsibility to make foreign policy decisions.u
1
In Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board of California,' for
example, corporate taxpayers challenged California's worldwide com-
bined reporting requirement for the calculation of a franchise tax un-
der the Commerce Clause because it was likely to "provoke retalia-
tory action by foreign governments."' The Supreme Court rejected
this challenge and with it the foreign relations effects tests it had pre-
viously applied to such claims.3 ' The Court explained that foreign pol-
icy nuances were the province of the Executive and Congress, not the
courts.'3 Thus, it instead relied, in rule-like fashion, on the lack of a
federal law preempting state action.33 Since none had done so, the
state's action was valid because Congress, not the Court, has the re-
sponsibility to strike the balance between international relations risks
and state autonomy.' The Court presumed validity in the face of Con-
gressional silence.'
5
126 Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1424 (cited in note 21).
127 Id at 1395.
12 Id at 1395. See, for example, Barclays Bank PLC v Franchise Tax Board of Cal, 512 US
298,321-31 (1994) (requiring express action by Congress to preempt state action that implicated
foreign affairs); EEOC v Arabian American Oil Co, 499 US 244,249-59 (1991) (requiring an ex-
press statement by Congress to find that a statute applies extraterritorially), superseded by the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub L No 102-166,105 Stat 1071, codified at 42 USC § 2000e(f) (1994);
W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co v Environmental Tectonics Corp, 493 US 400,408-10 (1990) (refusing to
apply the act of state doctrine in a case that did not involve validity of a foreign sovereign's act).
129 512 US 298 (1994). For a discussion of Barclays in the context of the "new formalism,"
see Goldsmith, 70 U Col L Rev at 1425-27 (cited in note 21).
130 Barclays, 512 US at 328.
131 Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1426 (cited in note 21).
132 Barclays, 512 US at 327-28.
133 Id at 326-28.
134 Id at 330-31 ("[W]e leave it to Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's-to
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In W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co v Environmental Tectronics Corp,'1 to
take another example, Environmental Tectronics claimed that
Kirkpatrick had obtained a contract with the Nigerian Government by
bribing Nigerian officials.w In its defense, Kirkpatrick raised the act of
state doctrine which precludes courts from "passing on the validity of
foreign acts of state" because this "may hinder the conduct of foreign
affairs."' 3 Both lower courts had analyzed the foreign relations effects
of a decision in this case, and had reached opposite results."' The Su-
preme Court, however, rejected this approach and avoided deciding
any fine-grain foreign relations matters by "establishing a scope-
limiting rule like preliminary inquiry"' 40 Specifically, the court noted
that while some of the policies underlying the act of state cases were
implicated in this case (for example, avoidance of embarrassment to
the Executive in its conduct of foreign affairs), the factual predicates
of the doctrine were not met because the case did not require the
court to pass on the validity of an official action by a foreign sover-
eign. 1 Thus, the act of state doctrine was inapplicable,43 and the court
did not need to engage in foreign policy analysis. In a future case, if
the factual predicates were met, the court still would have to wade
through foreign policy. But by strictly requiring that these factual
predicates exist, the court preemptively limited its future forays into
foreign policy in the act of state context."
Courts should let these cases, and their rule-directed aim, be their
guide. Under the current Keith standard, the content of federal law
(for example, whether there is a warrant requirement) is not known
until a court decides whether "undue interference" exists'45-in other
words, until a court does some freelance foreign policy work. While a
Supreme Court decision could specify the content of federal law by
applying the Keith test to determine whether there is a warrant re-
quirement for foreign intelligence searches abroad, this specification
would not "be prior to the point of judicial decision" in any meaning-
evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state autonomy?').
135 Id.
136 493 US 400 (1990).
137 Id at 402. For a discussion of Kirkpatrick in the context of the "new formalism," see
Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1425-27 (cited in note 21).
135 Kirkpatrick, 493 US at 404.
139 Id at 403-04 (discussing the district court's finding that a nation's motivation was at issue
and the court of appeal's reversal based on the facts of the case).
140 Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1426 (cited in note 21).
141 Kirkpatrick, 493 US at 406,409.
142 Id at 406 ("Act of state issues only arise when a court must decide-that is, when the
outcome of the case turns upon-the effect of official action by a foreign sovereign.").
143 Id.
144 Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1426 (cited in note 21).
145 Keith, 407 US at 315.
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ful sense.'4 It would still flow from a standard that every court, the Su-
preme Court included, is unable to competently apply. A rule, on the
other hand, would arise before any judicial decision in an intellectual,
if not chronological, sense because it would exist independent of any
court's assessment of the foreign policy merits of any particular case. 14
Moreover, courts could apply this rule whereas they were unable
competently to apply the Keith standard. In order to decide whether it
can issue a warrant in a traditional criminal context, a court must con-
clude that there is probable cause to believe an offense has been
committed and that the warrant would target the individual or indi-
viduals who have committed the offense. '4 Though different from the
task of deciding whether to issue a warrant in a traditional case, the
charge of the foreign intelligence case is not outside the ken of the ju-
diciary.
Courts would simply be performing a routine legal task-
assessing factual evidence to determine whether it meets a legal stan-
dard (probable cause). As the Second Circuit wrote, "While courts are
not competent to formulate national policy," it is their duty to deter-
mine whether "the political branches, in exercising their power, have
'chosen a constitutionally permissible means of implementing that
power. ' 4 9 In other words, while the courts lack the foreign policy ex-
pertise necessary to determine whether an undue burden exists (to
formulate national policy), they are able to decide whether probable
cause exists (to decide whether constitutional means were chosen).
In these cases, as with FISA cases, it would be sensible for the
courts to look for probable cause that the target of the warrant had
foreign intelligence information (rather than probable cause that she
had committed a criminal offense). On first glance, this probable cause
requirement might not appear to place any real limitations on the Ex-
ecutive because foreign intelligence information sounds like a ma-
nipulable concept. But, in fact, probable cause would cabin the Execu-
tive by eliminating the most egregious misuses of the power. The
146 Goldsmith, 70 U Colo L Rev at 1424 (cited in note 21).
147 One might argue that by choosing a formalist rule the court would be making a foreign
policy decision-namely, to ignore foreign affairs concerns.This is true in a sense. But it would be
more accurate to frame this decision as one of institutional competence rather than foreign pol-
icy. In other words, foreign policy is ignored because the Executive's built-in bias in search deci-
sions prevents it from impartially considering such information, and the courts are not designed
to judge such information, leading them to defer to the Executive. This Comment does not ad-
dress the hypothetical question of whether it would be proper to consider foreign policy infor-
mation if the Executive were impartial in making search decisions or if the courts were experts
on formulating foreign policy.
148 Charles A. Wright, 3 Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 670 at 708-19 (West 2d
ed 1982) (providing a detailed description of the warrant process).
149 Lamont v Woods, 948 F2d 825, 832 (2d Cir 1991), quoting Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion Inc vAgency for International Development, 838 F2d 649,655-56 (2d Cir 1988).
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courts should require that, as in FISA cases, the Government provide
evidence showing probable cause that the target of the warrant was
not just being targeted for her views (permitted First Amendment ac-
tivities), but that she was an agent of a foreign power,' -" and the prem-
ises to be searched are owned, used, or possessed by the agent or the
foreign power.'-" This is a real, and not insubstantial, evidentiary bur-
den.
Of course, the courts will have discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists. And if a court wants to defer to the Executive,
this is where it will do so. But that does not mean that the probable
cause standard does not do any work. First, it extricates the courts
from foreign policy. While foreign affairs information would be rele-
vant to a decision about probable cause in the foreign intelligence
context, the court would not be forced to make an independent for-
eign policy assessment-it would only have to decide a legal question.
As the Court underscored in Baker v Carr, "it is error to suppose
that every case or controversy which touches on foreign affairs lies
beyond judicial cognizance. ''1n Second, vis-h-vis the no-warrant rule,
the probable cause standard beneficially shifts discretion from the Ex-
ecutive to courts. This shift of discretion is beneficial in the context of
the Fourth Amendment because the Executive has a built-in institu-
tional bias in favor of conducting searches, whereas the courts are
neutral intermediaries between the Executive and the citizenry.
B. The Warrant Rule Comports Better with the Fourth Amendment
than a No-Warrant Rule
This rule-bound inquiry would fit into existing Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence revolves
around courts making reasonableness assessments. Courts ordinarily
eschew formalism in this context because of "the infinite and unpre-
dictable search and seizure scenarios that defy advance judicial con-
templation."'5 5 Instead, they focus on balancing liberty and order be-
150 50 USC § 1824(a)(3)(A) (1994).
151 50 USC § 1824(a)(3)(B).
152 369 US 186 (1962).
153 1dat211.
154 United States v Ramirez, 523 US 65,71 (1998) (discussing reasonableness as applied to a
"no-knock" entry that resulted in the destruction of property); Pennsylvania v Mimms, 434 US
106,108-09 (1977) ("The touchstone of our analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the
reasonableness in all circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's per-
sonal security."'), quoting Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1,19 (1968).
155 Stephen E. Hessler, Note, Establishing Inevitability without Active Pursuit: Defining the
Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 99 Mich L Rev 238,
259 (2000).
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cause this imbues the Fourth Amendment with the flexibility it needs
to meet the changing demands of the real world."'
But because courts focus on the application of the Fourth
Amendment in the United States, they assume that they are capable
of conducting the necessary balancing. ' If the courts are not capable
of conducting the necessary balancing tests, however, as is the case
with the foreign intelligence exception, then a rule is preferable.-' This
is one of the insights of the rules-standards debate.'59 Standards and
the concomitant discretion they give the decisionmaker are relatively
desirable only if the decisionmaker has sufficient knowledge from
which to make an informed choice. ' ° If she does not, as in this case,
then a rule is desirable. Choosing, in a broad sense, rules over stan-
dards leaves unanswered the question of what rule to choose -a war-
rant rule or a no-warrant rule.
The courts should answer this question by choosing the warrant
rule because it comports better with the purposes of the Fourth
Amendment-as delineated by both the Court and the Framers-than
does the alternative no-warrant rule. It offers more protection to the
citizen than the no-warrant rule because it requires the Executive to
convince a neutral party, a magistrate, that a search is reasonable and
limited.'6 And according to the Supreme Court, "The basic purpose of
[the Fourth] Amendment, as recognized in countless decisions of this
Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against
156 Meares and Harcourt, 90 J Crim L & Criminol at 737 (cited in note 124) ("The Court's
recognition and embrace of real world experience forced a rejection of the formalism character-
istic of nineteenth century Fourth and Fifth Amendment decisions.").
157 See Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520, 559 (1979) (arguing that "[t]he test of reasonableness
under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition.... In each case it requires a
balancing...") (emphasis added).
158 Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 NYU L Rev 74, 92 (2000) (arguing that the
Court is better off deciding foreign policy questions in the aggregate rather than making an indi-
vidual assessment in each case).
159 There is a wealth of literature on the rules versus standards debate. See generally Louis
Kaplow, Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L J 557 (1992) (offering an
economic analysis on whether a law should be "given content ex ante or ex post"); Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 Harv L Rev 22 (1992) (arguing that
the contribution of the Reagan-Bush appointees to the Supreme Court was to move policy to-
ward rules); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175 (1989)
(supporting the use of rules and eschewing "balancing modes of analysis"); Vermeule, 75 NYU L
Rev 74 (cited in note 158) (proposing that rules are preferable to standards in an environment of
empirical uncertainty due to their lower transaction costs).
160 Vermeule, 75 NYU L Rev at 92-93 (cited in note 158) ("Standards require more infor-
mation and decisional competence ex post.").
161 Camara v Municipal Court, 387 US 523,528-29 (1967) ("[A] search of private property
without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search war-
rant.").
162 Johnson v United States, 333 US 10, 14 (1948) (finding the essential protection of the
Fourth Amendment to consist in the determination of a neutral magistrate that there is sufficient
evidence to support a warrant).
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arbitrary invasions by government officials." This pronouncement by
the Court echoes the Framers' understanding of the Fourth Amend-
ment as a tool to limit the exercise of arbitrary discretion by members
of the executive branch to decide where and whom to search.'4
This is not to say that there are no serious arguments for the no-
warrant rule. First, the no-warrant rule serves the same crucial pur-
pose as the warrant rule-it frees the judiciary from making foreign
policy decisions. Second, one might argue that unlike the warrant rule,
it does not eliminate what may be important foreign policy concerns
from the decision of whether to conduct a search. Instead, the no-
warrant rule entrusts them to the Executive who has expertise in mak-
ing these decisions. Moreover, the argument would continue, the
events of September 11 show that foreign policy concerns matter. The
ability to search someone for foreign intelligence information may
save lives.
The most fundamental problem with the no-warrant rule is that it
ignores the central idea behind the Fourth Amendment: a neutral
party, the courts, should make decisions about searches." If the Execu-
tive could conduct warrantless searches for foreign intelligence infor-
mation, then it would have the kind of discretion that is readily subject
to grave abuses. The Government could, for example, invoke "foreign
policy concerns" to justify warrantless searches of dissident or disfa-
vored groups even if they had no real foreign intelligence informa-
tion.'6 Furthermore, instituting a warrant requirement would not sig-
nificantly hinder the Government's ability to prevent a replay of the
horrible events of September 11. The Government could still conduct
the necessary foreign intelligence searches; it would just have to show
probable cause that the target possessed foreign intelligence informa-
tion.'6 And in the event that a search were necessary to prevent immi-
nent danger to life and limb, the Government could execute a war-
163 Camara, 387 US at 528.
164 Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment Theory, 41
UCLA L Rev 199, 296 (1993) (discussing the Framers' desire to eliminate the exercise of arbi-
trary discretion, usually by the executive branch, in searches and seizures).
165 Johnson, 333 US at 14 (noting that to allow searches without a warrant is to "reduce the
[Fourth] Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of
police officers").
166 The Keith Court had the same concern about warrantless domestic intelligence searches.
See Keith, 407 US at 314.
167 Moreover, this probable cause standard, which is analogous to FISA's standard, is lower
than the traditional probable cause standard. See Robert A. Dawson, Shifting the Balance: The
D. C Circuit and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978,61 Geo Wash L Rev 1380,1393
n 73 (1993) (noting that FISA's probable cause standard is lower because the same proof of
criminal activity is not necessary).
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rantless search under the exigency exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment."'
C. A Warrant Would Serve an Important Pre-Clearance Function
A warrant issued after a finding of probable cause would serve
the same pre-clearance function abroad that it serves domestically.
Recently, in United States v Verdugo-Urquidez,'O a plurality of the Su-
preme Court wrote that a warrant is a "dead letter outside of the
United States."' Bin Laden cited this language to show that such a
warrant would be useless, and therefore an undue burden on the Ex-
ecutive.'7 Though never explained by the plurality in Verdugo, this
language presumably means that a warrant would not "authorize" a
search as a matter of international law.' For example, even if the
Government were armed with a warrant from an American magis-
trate, it could not search a United States citizen in France without the
permission of the French government.73
The Verdugo Court's narrow view of the purpose of a warrant
overlooks the important limiting function a warrant plays in our sys-
tem. A warrant limits the discretion of the executive in order to pro-
tect the rights of the individual; it is not simply a legal password. So,
even if a warrant would not be a sufficient condition for a search, it
should be a necessary one. As Justice Brennan recognized in dissent in
Verdugo, "a warrant serves the same primary function overseas as it
does domestically: it assures that a neutral magistrate has authorized
the search and limited its scope."74 Whatever one thinks about the
logic of Verdugo, its holding was limited to the application of the war-
rant clause to noncitizens abroad.175
168 Mincey v Arizona, 437 US 385,392-93 (1978) ("'The need to protect or preserve life or
avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
emergency."'), quoting Wayne v United States, 318 F2d 205,212 (DC Cir 1963).
169 494 US 259 (1990). This case held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the
search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and located
in a foreign country. Id at 261.
170 Id at 274.
171 Bin Laden, 126 F Supp 2d at 276.
172 Verdugo, 494 US at 296 (Brennan dissenting) (acknowledging that a warrant from a
United States magistrate would not authorize a search in a foreign country under international
law, but cautioning that does not make the Warrant Clause inapplicable).
173 Without permission from the foreign government, the enforcement jurisdiction of the
United States would run headlong into the customary international law norm of territorial sov-
ereignty. See Ayaz R. Shaikh, Note, A Theoretic Approach to Transnational Terrorism, 80 George-
town L J 2131, 2159 (1992) (discussing the problem of extending one state's enforcement juris-
diction into another's because of state territorial sovereignty).
174 Verdugo, 494 US at 296 (Brennan dissenting).
175 Id at 278 (Kennedy concurring) ("The rights of a citizen, as to whom the United States
has continuing obligations, are not presented by this case.").
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There are two possible paths for implementing the warrant rule:
1) the Supreme Court could implement it, or 2) the lower courts could
narrowly interpret Keith to the same effect. The first path is straight-
forward. The Court would simply decide (as it did in Keith7') that
there is no exception to the warrant requirement in this situation. Ab-
sent such a sea change in high Court precedent, the lower courts could
implement this rule by interpreting Keith to apply only to domestic
intelligence searches-given that the Court consistently distinguished
domestic intelligence searches from the foreign intelligence searches."
The first path is preferable because of its finality, but the exigencies of
the moment (the number of warrantless searches and the slow path to
the Supreme Court) may require lower courts to shoulder the burden
of moving to the new, better rule.
CONCLUSION
Since the early 1970s, the courts have intermittently misapplied
the Warrant Clause to foreign intelligence searches. In 1978, FISA, for
all practical purposes, took the issue out of the courts' hands. But with
Bin Laden, this issue experienced a renaissance in the courts. Without
missing a beat, the Bin Laden court fell back into the judiciary's old,
troubled ways. The trouble is that the Keith standard binds the deci-
sion of whether to issue a warrant to a judicial analysis of foreign pol-
icy. Formally and functionally ill-equipped to analyze foreign policy,
the courts have deferred to the Executive's position.
This Comment asks the courts to require, by rule, that the Execu-
tive obtain a warrant before she conducts a foreign intelligence search
targeted at an American citizen overseas. By adopting this rule, the
courts could both protect the Fourth Amendment right to privacy and
avoid making foreign policy assessments. Moreover, this change would
fit into both the burgeoning foreign affairs law doctrine of new for-
malism and existing criminal procedure jurisprudence. In the absence
of such a change, the Sword of Damocles in the form of judicial abdi-
cation will continue to hang over the rights of American citizens over-
seas.
176 .Id at 321.
177 Id at 308,321-22 (limiting the opinion to domestic intelligence cases and expressing no
opinion as to requirements for foreign intelligence searches).
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